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RESPECT
Natural Law, Natural Philosophy, Natural Rights
Joshua B. Stein, Professor, Department of History
When in the summer of 1776 the Second Continental Congress commissioned an explanation and justifica-
tion of its acts of defiance of the Btitish Crown, the document produced, "The Declaration of Independence,"
eloquently put the case. Amongst other things, it assumes that human beings are endowed by their creator
with inalienable rights and that amongst these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Two things
mentioned bear further attention and are, indeed, the focus of this investigation. Who and or what is the
creator (and how is that we can presume to read his mind and know his intentions) and how do we know
there are inalienable tights? As will become clear in the pages below, the idea of the creator is a powerful
concept that permeates western thought from at least the period of the ancient Greeks to Jefferson's day. In
fact, it is the confluence of ancient pagan philosophy (here represented by Cicero) and seventeenth century
science, with only a dollop of Chtistian thought, that combines to create the ideas so fundamental to the
American civil experience.
Cicero
The sources of Matcus Tullius Cicero's (106-43 BCE) views on natural law are numerous but De Legibus [On
the Laws] provides the most succinct statement. Cicero differentiates between "law" and "Law," the former
being what courts are concerned with and the latter being "the highest reason, implanted in Nature which
commands what ought to be done and forbids the opposite" [Laws I, vi, 18]. Law is therefore a natural force
and in it we can find the origin of Justice [Laws I, vi, 19]. This Law "had its origins ages before any written
law existed." The question then becomes "How do we know Law?" [Laws I, iv, 13].
Since reason exists in, and is a gift of God (thought of a perfect reason) "we must now conceive of rhis
whole universe as one commonwealth of which born gods and men are members" [Ibid]. But still the question
remains, where to look?The answet is, seek Justice in Nature [Laws!, v, 11; viii, 25-26-ix, 27]. This has a double
meaning. By "Nature" Cicero means both the qualities that are shared by all humans-which only vices, bad
habits and falsebeliefs, serve to disguise, making it appear that we are different, when, in fact, we are all equal.
Therefore by "look into Nature" Cicero is saying, look into ourselves, for the answer is already there-but we are
blinded to it by ignorance, prejudice and superstition. The other meaning of Nature, no less important, is the
outside world, that which we often refer to as the natural world (as opposed to man-made).
"Law is not a product of human thought, nor is it any enactment of peoples, but something eternal
which rules the whole universe by its wisdom in command and prohibition. Thus ... Law is the primal and
ultimate mind of God whose teason directs all things ... This Law is coeval with that God who guards and
rules heaven and earth" [Laws II, iv, 9-10]. \Y!eknow what is right and wrong. There was no law against rape
in Rome when it was a monarchy, when one of the king's sons taped the matron Lucretia, "but there was
reason, derived from the Nature of the universe, urging men to right conduct." This did not become law
when it was written down: "it came into existence simultaneously with the divine mind" [Laws II, iv, 10].
Seventeenth Century Contributions
Relations between Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) and the Roman church of his day were not always cordial.
Essentially, the Church was opposed to the idea of the sun-centered universe Galileo championed because it
seemed to fly in the face of apparent biblical teachings and definitely because they contradicted Aristotle who,
since the twelfth century had been incorporated into church teachings on a par with the fathers, church
councils, even with the bible. An attack on any of these institutions was seen as an attack on the Church.
Galileo was warned and he fought back. In his Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina he made the near-fatal
error of preaching as a layman to clergymen, telling them what the bible taught-and it was not science, but
theology and morality. He spent the test of his life under house arrest, a penalty much milder than it could
have been. It is said that as he entered his confinement Galileo stamped his foot on the ground and mutteted
"Eppur si muove"-"And yet (despite the Church's silencing me) it (the earth) still moves."
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Something imponant has happened here. When Cicero talked of nature he was speaking of what
could be simply observed. The sun always rises in the east; the seasons are a regular and predictable result; the
tides ebb and flow; the moon has its phases. The list of observable phenomena is unending. Bur now no
longer do people simply observe nature; now they will study it mathematically and empirically. From nature
observers (naturalists) in the seventeenth century we are beginning to become scientists. It will make all the
difference in the use of nature to explain human behavior.
Isaac Newton (1642-1727) was so far ahead of his age that it was necessary for him to invent a new
mathematical system to explore the possibilities he conjured. It all came together for him with his understand-
ing that the laws of physics that operated on the earth were not an inferior form compared to the laws in the
heavens. In fact, they were one and the same (Philosophiae Natura/is Principia Mathematica, 1687). The
known world (what we call the univetse) had been explained. It was all natural, it was all predictable, it was all
invariable and unchangeable.
At this point our story begins to look like the tines in a five-pronged fork (granted, this is a very
unusual piece of flatware). Thomas Hobbes and John Locke form two of the points, deists a third, reports
from the South Pacific a fourth, and the teachings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau the fifth. We will take these one
at a time, all culminating with the Declaration ofIndependence.
Hobbes and Locke were each products of the tumultuous period of English history that occupied the
island for the eighty-five years from 1603. Ironically, when the struggles were over, each held a view of natural
law diametrically opposed to the other, a classic example of how two equally brilliant people, observing exactly
the same phenomena can find that in the end they share no common ground, but could still maintain a civil
intellectual discourse.
To Thomas Hobbes (1567-1678) the idea that God created the institution of monarchy so as to rule
his people indirectly was an absurdity hardly worthy of mention-yet monarchy is to him the sine qua non of
political reality. He hypothesizes that in the state of nature all men are equal. This ro Hobbes was a recipe for
disaster. In such a world no one was safe. Since all were equal, each took whatever they could get away with.
No one planted or manufactured because whenever his labor came to fruition, someone would inevitably steal
it. Life in the state of nature was bloody in tooth and claw characterized as being "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish
and short" [Leviathan]. The only way out of this diabolical existence was for all men to surrender rights to a
central authority who, being now the only one to possess them, could control all of us, guaranteeing a life of
relative security. Diminishing this power one iota would be to start a process resulting in the crumbling of the
political fabric culminating in a return to the derestable state of nature. If proof be needed, JUStlook at what
had transpired in the England of Charles I and the interregnum. Opposition to his authority led to civil war, a
breakdown of society and recognition that other ways simply did not work. Do we retain any natural rights?
Only the two-the right to obey the sovereign (and in the process preserve our lives and property), the other
to self-defense.
John Locke (1632-1704) was in agreement with his older contemporary on two significant points
only. Life in a state of nature was a constant struggle for survival and we need government to channel and
control the aggressive tendencies of mankind. But whereas Hobbes argued that to gain security it was abso-
lutely essential to give up both power and rights to an absolutist governor, Locke maintained that we surren-
der only our power to punish those who injure us. In facr, government is instituted by the agreement of the
people with the object of protecting our inalienable rights, of which he gives four examples-life, liberty,
property, and resistance to oppression by a government we have entrusted with the duty of preventing oppres-
sion. To Locke, nothing, not even religion, is to be controlled by the state for the greater good [Letter on
TOleration].While to Hobbes absolutism is the only assurance against anarchy, to Locke it is even worse than
life in a state of nature. In those primordial times, everybody had power; everybody was equal. With absolut-
ism only the one man, the sovereign, has power and there is no check, no control no appeal on how he uses it.
Under Hobbes, discourse is civil only because no one is allowed to dissent; under Locke discourse may be less
civil, but civil life is more discursive.
The Eighteenth Century
It is during the Enlightenment that the warp and weft of what has preceded comes together to form the
tapestry of modern life within the framework of the idea of natural law. It was during this era that the science
of the previous age was combined with the philosophy of the Romans within the framework of the English
civil war and its aftermath to produce both a revolutionary way of viewing the world and revolutionary
tendencies that would have their impact down to the present.
If it is true that the forces of nature are everywhere the same, eternal and immurable in the heavens
and on earth (which, of course, was now seen to be in the heavens), there are at least two obvious conse-
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quences co this discovery. The first is that someone or somebody must have created this perfecrion. Newcon
had demonstrared that every effect has a cause. If the world exists, something must have created it. There were
fWO contenders for the honor. One was God, the othet nature-that the universe had created itself. In either
case, rules both physical and social had been established co guide it, rules that could be realized through the
use of human reason.
Those who argued that God was the original creator might be said to be supportive of Christian
ideology, bur this would be a misstatement. Christianity teaches that God created the world with the inten-
rion of helping man to achieve salvation. This He does by interfering (participating) with man via direct oral
communication (as with Moses), by assuming human shape (Jesus), by performing miracles (everything from
splitting the sea so rhat the Hebrews could walk through dry shod co the daily miracle of the Eucharist). To
this the Enlightenment generally said "No! It never happened." If the world were created with perfect laws of
physics, then any change in perfection would, by definition, be a diminution, it would be creating imperfec-
tion. Surely the God who created such a perfect world would not want to alter even an iota of it. The classic
analogy is of the clock maker who designed the perfectly running clock, one that never needed winding and
never gained or lost a second. Would he open up the back and turn a screw even a quarter of a degree? Of
course not-by doing so he would by altering the perfection of the clock. This argument, of course, hearkens
back to Galileo's sarcastic refutation of the idea that on command the sun could stand still in the sky.
The second lesson is that given the existence of a perfect law of physics governing the heavens and the
earth, there must also be universal laws of society ascertainable by reason, applicable in aUages and in all
countries. This last is an example of a greater theory, that all men are created equal and have natural rights
neither diminished nor increased by their birth status or role in society. It is a return to, and an expansion of
(when combined with the teachings ofliberty of Locke and the world view of the deists), the ideas of the old
Roman with whose ideas we began and whose writings served almost as a primer for the American revolution-
aries and authors of the Constitution.
There remain fWO more tines on the fork. The first of these is a new way to view the state of nature
discovered in the eighteenth century. In 1768 Louis Antoine de Bougainville of France, and the next year,
James Cook of England, landed in Tahiti and began sending reports of the luxurious islands of plenty, inhab-
ited by simple carefree sexually liberated people. Heaven on earth had been found. Nevertheless when their
reports filrered back to Europe a new perspective on nature and life in the state of nature was suddenly
envisioned, a life free of care and free of the constraints of Christianity, a life of Eden-like peace, not the
solitary, nasty, poor, brurish and short existence assumed by the seventeenth century. The state of nature was
not barbarous-it was lovely. It was society that corrupted purity. With this perception comes the idea of the
noble savage and, indirectly, at least, the teachings ofJean-Jacques Rousseau.
Rousseau (1712-1778) was a product and creator of the Enlightenment generally at odds with his
contemporaries, many of whom thought him mad. He was convinced that everywhere man is born free yet
remains in chains [The Social Contract]. It is in an attempt to explain this dichotomy that he begins to write of
natural law in yet another perspective. To Rousseau, in a state of nature we are all free but this freedom is
frightening because it brings with it dangers from others. What we do, he argued in The Social Contract
(1762), is agree co abide by the unwritten, unspoken but generally accepted General Will of the community.
It is that which binds us, that which is known to our leader, who emerges from amongst us, and whom we
follow. This General Will is not universal; it is particular to specific groups of people, each of which follows its
own general will. The leader is not elected: he emerges from the people, knowing what it is they, the commu-
nity, want. Adherence to the general will must be universal or the system will fail. Therefore, those who
disobey the general will must be made to see the error of their ways or be punished by banishment or death.
Clearly we have strayed here from the principles of democracy and reason. "Will" is an unreasoning desire to
do that which is necessary to get one's way-whether it be power, sex, or simply maintenance of life. One does
what one has to. The general will is merely an extension of this personal will, what Sigmund Freud would later
call libido. When combined with the perceived need for absolutism expounded by Hobbes, it mutates into the
totalitarian forms in last century's Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia. But one does not have to go so
far into Rousseau's future to see the perversions of this doctrine. As he was condemning thousands to the
guillotine Maximillian Robespierre, prime mover of the Reign of Terror, was quoting the doctrine of Jean-
Jacques.
All of which brings us back to our starting point. The Declaration of Independence's assertion that
there was a creator who endowed man with inalienable rights can now be seen co fit like a jigsaw puzzle piece
into the mosaic of thought developed over the previous twenty-t\vo centuries. Who is the creacor?That is left
unspecified on purpose. Those who want to believe He is the Christian God may do so; those like Jefferson,
Adams and Franklin, who were at most deists, could think of him as nature or, as Cicero might have had it, as
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a divine intelligence. How do we presume to read His mind? He has given us nature to learn from and reason
as the tool to study it. It is nature that teaches the doctrine of inalienable rights, of justice of law as the
intention of the creator and whether we draw our conclusions from the armchair observation of rational
thought or from the laborious exercise of science and mathematical reasoning the same conclusion is reached.
There is such a thing as natural law: we are bound by it with the same intensity that binds us to the planet.
Both the physical reality of gravity and the social reality of justice were created by the same clock maker,
probably at the same time. Governments that wish to defY the laws of gravity are doomed to fail. Those that,
like George Ill's England, try to ignore reality are doomed to fail, condemned to be opposed by the rational-
just as they would oppose any government that decreed that gravity was henceforth inoperable, null and void.
The planetary laws of Kepler and the physics of Galileo turned out to be one and the same, as demonstrated
by Newton. The physical laws of Newton and the social laws of John Locke turned out to be one and the
same as well. This convergence would have come as no surprise to Marcus Tullius Cicero to whom the
universality of man, of nature, was recognized as the basis for all human social and intellectual intercourse, the
basis of civil discourse.
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